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OverviewArchitecture & Security ModelWaaP vs Embedded Wallet Services

WaaP vs embedded wallet services

“Embedded wallet” covers several different products. A hosted key service, a key-splitting provider, an MPC network, and a smart-account platform all ship under that name, and they do not share a trust model. The comparison below is by property, so it stays true whichever one a reader is holding.

The four questions worth asking

Ask these of any provider, including this one.

Who can sign without the user?Whoever holds enough key material to complete a signature. Read the architecture, not the marketing
Does the wallet work outside this app?A wallet scoped to one application resets the user’s history every time they move
What happens when the user’s device is compromised?If a key or a share lives on the device, malware gets it
What happens when the interface lies?If the transaction is simulated client-side, a compromised frontend can show one thing and sign another

How the properties compare

PropertyWaaPTypical embedded wallet service
Key locationGenerated in an attested TEE, never on the deviceVaries. Often a provider-held key or a share on the device
Signing without the userNot without passing the policy gate. In Squid Mode, not by any single partyUsually the provider can sign
Account scopeOne account across applicationsUsually scoped to the integrating app
Where policy is enforcedServer-side, before a signature existsVaries. Often absent, or advisory
Transaction simulationServer-side, so it does not depend on what the interface drewOften client-side or absent
Cost to integrateFree. Pricing above the free tier is not finalisedUsually per-MAU or per-signature

What this does not claim

It is not a claim that every embedded wallet service is custodial. Several are genuinely non-custodial, and the good ones differ from each other more than the category name suggests.

The claim is narrower: the questions above have answers, and the answers should decide the choice. A provider that cannot answer “who can sign without the user” in one sentence is the signal.

How a signature is protectedWhere the key lives, and what has to be true before it signsCore architectureEnclave custody and the authorization gateMalware resistanceCompromised devices and serversBlind signing resistanceTransaction simulation and secure channels
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